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How Wal-Mart Fights Unions 
Nelson Lichtenstein† 
Wal-Mart is America’s most controversial corporation, not 
only because of its sheer size and global reach, but because the 
Bentonville, Arkansas-based company has been highly asser-
tive in keeping its labor costs among the lowest in the retail in-
dustry. Pioneering technological and organizational innova-
tions account for a portion of Wal-Mart’s advantage, but the 
nation’s largest private employer has also been hostile to labor 
regulations. It has often violated the phalanx of laws, adminis-
trative rulings, and enforcement mechanisms that constitute 
the governmental regulation of work and labor established in 
the United States during the decades of social reform that 
stretched from the Progressive Era, through the New Deal, and 
on into the 1960s and early 1970s. For nearly two decades Wal-
Mart has faced a stream of litigation charging that company 
policies violate and distort state and federal laws covering over-
time pay, workers’ compensation, the minimum wage, fair em-
ployment practices, and various health and safety regulations.1 
Even more important, Wal-Mart has successfully fought 
unionization in every one of its more than four thousand stores 
and distribution centers in the United States, which collectively 
employ almost 1.3 million “associates.”2 Like the federal mini-
mum wage, American labor law was designed to raise wages, 
albeit through a collective bargaining relationship between a 
group of employees and the firm for which they work. But com-
 
†  Professor of History, University of California, Santa Barbara. Copy-
right © 2008 by Nelson Lichtenstein. 
 1. See Nelson Lichtenstein, Why Working at Wal-Mart Is Different, 39 
CONN. L. REV. 1652, 1675–76 (2007); see also LIZA FEATHERSTONE, SELLING 
WOMEN SHORT: THE LANDMARK BATTLE FOR WORKER’S RIGHTS AT WAL-MART 
200–03 (2004). 
 2. Wal-Mart, Inc., Employment and Diversity Fact Sheet 1–2, http:// 
www.walmartfacts.com/FactSheets/Employment_and_Diversity.pdf (last vi-
sited Apr. 14, 2008). 
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panies like Wal-Mart have found trade unionism far more ob-
noxious than any federal mandate that boosted wages or in-
sured payment of overtime and lunch breaks. By its very 
ture a trade union challenges managerial authority. It ques-
questions the moral, paternal claim that executives and man-
agers speak and act on behalf of an essentially harmonious 
terprise. The absence of a collective employee voice at Wal-
Mart and the dozens of retail chains and the thousands of 
dor firms that follow its lead generate an essentially authorita-
rian organizational culture within a huge sector of the economy 
and distorts the political and economic discourse of the larger 
polity. 
This Article traces the historical origins of Wal-Mart anti-
unionism and identifies some of the National Labor Relations 
Board (NLRB) decisions that proved crucial to this corporate 
strategy. It then explores the way that key Wal-Mart figures, 
including founder Sam Walton and personnel executive John 
Tate, developed a corporate labor-relations regime that they 
used with such effectiveness against union efforts to organize 
warehouses and stores in the 1970s and early 1980s. Finally, 
this Article looks at the United Food and Commercial Workers 
campaign to organize a scattered set of Wal-Mart stores in the 
late 1990s and in the early years of the twenty-first century. 
The corporate response to a unionization effort at a Kingman, 
Arizona discount store provides a glimpse of why, under cur-
rent legal and business conditions, unionization is virtually im-
possible at Wal-Mart. The Article concludes with some though-
ts on how this condition might be transformed.  
I.  WAL-MART’S HISTORIC HOSTILITY TO UNIONISM   
“We have never had a union in Wal-Mart and don’t need 
one now to represent our associates,” Sam Walton told readers 
of the company’s internal publication, Wal-Mart World.3 “We 
resent outsiders coming in and saying things which aren’t true 
and trying to change the Company that has meant so much to 
all of us . . . .”4 This proved a sentiment heartily endorsed 
throughout the Wal-Mart managerial hierarchy. In the 1970s 
and 1980s, Larry English, one of Walton’s best young manag-
ers, was something of a maverick when it came to Bentonville’s 
increasingly systematic rationalization of the discount sales 
 
 3. Sam Walton, Keeping Our Partnership Strong, WAL-MART WORLD 
(Wal-Mart, Inc., Bentonville, Ark.), Oct. 1989, at 3, 3. 
 4. Id. 
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floor. But that did not mean that he would tolerate any chal-
lenge to his authority as a store manager. English’s disdain for 
unions was apparent: “I hated them because they wanted to tell 
me how to take care of my people and I know how. I don’t need 
someone to manage my store for me—I’ll go to my grave believ-
ing that.”5 
Such sentiments flourished in Northwest Arkansas, the 
rural, small-town, Ozark-flavored section of the state where 
Sam Walton built his first dozen discount stores in the 1960s.6 
In the United States, a militant hostility to trade unionism 
arose not where union labor was strong and pervasive, but 
where it seemed a threat to a regional economy structured 
around cheap labor, competitive enterprises, and a local elite.7 
That, of course, was Arkansas in the second half of the twen-
tieth century. In this region, the fear of union organization 
united the plantation owners of the Mississippi delta, the 
Ozark branch plant managers whose only competitive advan-
tage lay in cheap labor, and entrepreneurs of Northwest Ar-
kansas, like John Tyson, J. B. Hunt, and Sam Walton, who saw 
their booming firms as an extension of their paternalism and 
fiercely held autonomy.8 Led by the delta planters, who re-
membered well the biracial uprising led by the Southern Te-
nant Farmers Union in the 1930s, Arkansas in 1944 became 
the first state to pass a “right-to-work” referendum that made 
the union shop contract illegal.9 Such right-to-work laws weak-
 
 5. Interview with Larry English, Former Wal-Mart Store Manager, in 
Diamond Head, Ark. (June 7, 2006). 
 6. See BOB ORTEGA, IN SAM WE TRUST 166 (1998). 
 7. JAMES C. COBB, THE SELLING OF THE SOUTH: THE SOUTHERN CRU-
SADE FOR INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT, 1936–1990, at 61–63, 226–28 (1993); 
TIMOTHY J. MINCHIN, FIGHTING AGAINST THE ODDS: A HISTORY OF SOUTHERN 
LABOR SINCE WORLD WAR II, at 4–5 (2005); GAVIN WRIGHT, OLD SOUTH, NEW 
SOUTH: REVOLUTIONS IN THE SOUTHERN ECONOMY SINCE THE CIVIL WAR 262–
64 (1986); Ira Katznelson et al., Limiting Liberalism: The Southern Veto in 
Congress, 1933–1950, 108 POL. SCI. Q. 283, 298–99 (1993). 
 8. See BEN F. JOHNSON III, ARKANSAS IN MODERN AMERICA, 1930–1999, 
at 195–99 (2000); cf. Bethany Moreton, It Came from Bentonville: The Agrar-
ian Origins of Wal-Mart Culture, in WAL-MART: THE FACE OF TWENTY-FIRST-
CENTURY CAPITALISM 57, 72–74 (Nelson Lichtenstein ed., 2006) (examining 
Wal-Mart’s roots in Arkansas and how the “world’s largest corporation gr[e]w 
from the most violently antimonoply section of America”). 
 9. See GILBERT J. GALL, THE POLITICS OF RIGHT TO WORK, at xi (1988); 
MARTIN HALPERN, UNIONS, RADICALS, AND DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENTS 150 
(2003); see also Gilbert J. Gall, Southern Industrial Workers and Antiunion 
Sentiment: Arkansas and Florida in 1944, in ORGANIZED LABOR IN THE TWEN-
TIETH CENTURY SOUTH 223, 228–30 (Robert H. Zeiger ed., 1991). 
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ened existing unions because they made dues collection much 
more difficult. But, their greatest impact came in the realm of 
political symbolism and plebian ideology where, throughout the 
South and Mountain West, they were taken as a sign of go-
vernmental hostility to the existence of trade unionism.10 
Wal-Mart, however, would not remain a regional employer 
for long, nor would its stores and distribution centers be con-
fined to the small-town South where the absence of trade un-
ionism seemed almost naturalistic. If the company were to take 
its Southern-born paternalism, low wages, and hostility to or-
ganized labor beyond Northwest Arkansas, the company would 
have to develop a more sophisticated, systematic, and ostensi-
bly legal modus operandi. This would require a revolution in 
American labor law. 
When the Wagner Act was drafted in 1935, its provisions 
provided employees in any given enterprise the right to select 
“representatives of their own choosing” who could speak for 
them in the collective negotiations with the management of the 
firm.11 To make sure this happened, drafter Robert Wagner in-
serted a section that defined a set of “unfair labor practices” of 
which employers, but not unions, might be held accountable.12 
When conservative critics of his law complained that the 
Wagner Act was one-sided, the New York Senator replied that 
this was a “false equation.”13 The kind of “unfair labor practic-
es” in which workers might engage—physical or verbal intimi-
dation of their workmates, punched noses, and nasty threats—
all had been illegal for centuries, since the birth of the common 
law itself.14 But when it came to economic coercion of the sort 
that shouted “You’re fired if you mess with the union,” that was 
almost exclusively an employer weapon, which Wagner and 
other labor partisans sought to proscribe.15 The New Dealers 
that President Franklin Roosevelt first appointed to the NLRB 
interpreted the new Wagner Act to make the foreman and 
manager nonparticipants, when the workers they supervised 
 
 10. See GALL, supra note 9, at 19; HALPERN, supra note 9, at 150. 
 11. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act of 1935, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 158–169 (2000)). 
 12. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act § 8, 49 Stat. at 452–53; Ken-
neth Casebeer, Drafting Wagner’s Act: Leon Keyserling and the Pre-Committee 
Drafts of the Labor Disputes Act and the National Labor Relations Act, 11 IN-
DUS. REL. L.J. 73, 123 (1989). 
 13. DAVID BRODY, LABOR EMBATTLED 151 (2005). 
 14. See id. at 152. 
 15. See id. 
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decided for or against forming a union.16 Indeed, the NLRB 
ruled that given the imbalance of power in an unorganized fac-
tory, mine or mill, any kind of employer speech, presumably di-
rected toward convincing their employees to reject a union, was 
inherently coercive and therefore an unfair labor practice.17  
When the Republicans won the 1946 elections, it was just a 
matter of time before resentful employers got the Wagner Act 
fixed to their liking. Soon Congress passed the Taft-Hartley Act 
over President Harry S. Truman’s veto in June 1947.18 This 
Taft-Hartley revision of the Wagner Act particularly affected 
retail unions, which made a major push to organize chain su-
permarkets and department stores. At a 1951 conference of the 
Retail Clerks, union organizers attributed major losses in 
NLRB union elections to “captive-audience speeches”—
antiunion presentations that employers ordered their em-
ployees to attend.19 Initially, the NLRB insisted that unions get 
equal time on company property if management held such 
compulsory meetings, but once the Republicans gained control 
of the NLRB after President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s election, 
employers got almost everything they wanted.20 As one of the 
conservative businessmen appointed to that Board said in his 
confirmation hearing when referencing one of his successful 
campaigns against unionism, “we ‘free-speeched’ them. . . . 
Now, you could say, if you like, in that instance I was a union 
buster.”21 
Labor law still forbade employers from retaliating against 
workers who voted for a union by threatening them with firing 
or plant closure. But this doctrine became increasingly forma-
listic. Thus, in Chicopee Manufacturing Corp., the NLRB enun-
ciated a “prophecy doctrine” that permitted employers to state 
 
 16. See Craig Becker, Democracy in the Workplace: Union Representation 
Elections and Federal Labor Law, 77 MINN. L. REV. 495, 527–29 (1993). 
 17. See, e.g., Am. Tube Bending Co., 44 N.L.R.B. 121 (1942); see also 
James J. Brudney, Neutrality Agreements and Card Check Recognition: Pros-
pects for Changing Paradigms, 90 IOWA L. REV. 819, 868–74 (2005). 
 18. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.); see also MELVYN DU-
BOFSKY, THE STATE AND LABOR IN MODERN AMERICA 205 (1994).  
 19. SANFORD M. JACOBY, MODERN MANORS: WELFARE CAPITALISM SINCE 
THE NEW DEAL 203 (1997). 
 20. See Becker, supra note 16, at 560–61. 
 21. KIM PHILLIPS-FEIN, INVISIBLE HANDS: THE MAKING OF THE CONSERV-
ATIVE MOVEMENT FROM THE NEW DEAL TO REAGAN (forthcoming 2008) (quot-
ing an Eisenhower-era NLRB member). 
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that voting for a union might result in a plant being moved.22 
Mt. Ida Footwear Co.23 further refined the employer advantage. 
In this case, executives of an Arkansas-based shoemaker as-
serted that if employees signed union cards, it would “be fatal 
to a business such as Mt. Ida Footwear.”24 But the NLRB ruled 
that such threats could be rendered permissible if an executive 
“sanitized” this kind of coercive and threatening speech by 
merely inserting a catch-phrase like “We are here to stay,” 
which was the stratagem of Mt. Ida management.25 Meanwhile, 
in two rulings from the early 1950s, the NLRB transformed 
employer free speech into a powerful managerial weapon. In 
Livingston Shirt Corp. the NLRB ruled that an employer “does 
not commit an unfair labor practice if he makes a preelection 
speech on company time and premises to his employees and 
then denies the union’s request for an opportunity to reply.”26 
Further, in Esquire Inc. employers won the right to threaten 
that a pro-union vote would generate lengthy legal proceedings 
instead of the collective bargaining mandated by the original 
Wagner Act.27 
A. JOHN TATE AND MANAGEMENT “FREE SPEECH”  
Enter John Tate, the man who would sharpen these legal 
tools, stock them in Wal-Mart’s arsenal, and deploy them in fu-
rious combat with the unions. A man of Sam Walton’s genera-
tion, he was born in North Carolina, earned his law degree 
from Wake Forest Law School, and became a bitter foe of trade 
unionism, all before he enlisted in the Army.28 Tate acquired 
his bitter hostility to unionism in the labor wars of the late 
1930s, when he crossed through a union picket line established 
around the Reynolds Tobacco Company in Winston-Salem.29 
Aside from the catcalls, Tate took a blow on the head that he 
would never forget.30 “I hate unions with a passion,” he would 
later remark after he had established a pioneering law firm 
 
 22. See Chicopee Mfg. Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 106, 107 (1953). 
 23. 217 N.L.R.B. 1011 (1975). 
 24. Id. at 1012. 
 25. Id. at 1013. 
 26. 107 N.L.R.B. 400, 416 (1954). 
 27. 107 N.L.R.B. 1238, 1242 (1954); see Alan Story, Employer Speech, Un-
ion Representation Elections, and the First Amendment, 16 BERKELEY J. EMP. 
& LAB. L. 356, 455 (1995) (discussing these cases). 
 28. See ORTEGA, supra note 6, at 88. 
 29. See id. 
 30. See id. 
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dedicated to what, in the 1950s and 1960s, was a newly aggres-
sive “union avoidance” stratagem.31 
Tate perfected his antiunion skills in Nebraska where he 
battled the Teamsters and the Packinghouse Workers32 and 
traveled in right-wing political circles that linked a militant an-
tiunionism to a libertarian rejection of the welfare state, fair 
employment legislation, and regulatory oversight on the part of 
the federal government.33 Tate saw himself as a crusader for 
“freedom” who would rally the business class of Omaha and 
Lincoln in order to turn back this union invasion and put some 
ideological stiffness into the backbone of local employers.34 Tate 
sought to convince his clients that it was not enough to keep a 
union out of their shops alone. Rather, a decline in union densi-
ty and influence was essential to give businessmen a strong 
hand, even if they were so unfortunate as to be stuck with an 
existing collective bargaining contract.  
But Tate was not just a propagandist. He was a pioneer in 
the nascent union-avoidance industry. He realized that the 
fight against unionism had to be fought simultaneously on mul-
tiple fronts: before the NLRB and the courts, in the political 
arena, and most importantly, within the firm itself. Tate devel-
oped a whole repertoire of programs, techniques, and interven-
tions designed to generate employee loyalty to management 
and hostility to third-party representation. “The issues that are 
most frequently [the] cause of company-union disputes today 
are philosophical, not economic,” claimed Tate in 1960.35 “The 
battle is for the minds of employees . . . .”36 Backstopped by a 
phalanx of expert antilabor law firms, this has become com-
monplace employer behavior in recent years, but in the 1950s 
and early 1960s it was so audacious, innovative, and in the 
hands of John Tate, so successful, that a St. Louis unionist la-
 
 31. Steve Jordon, Antiunion Attorney Took ‘Golden Rule’ to Wal-Mart, 
OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, May 5, 1991, at 8M; see also ORTEGA, supra note 6, 
at 87–88. 
 32. See ORTEGA, supra note 6, at 87–88. 
 33. Jordon, supra note 31.  
 34. See id.; John Tate, Executive Vice-President, Midwest Employers 
Council, Remarks at FCC Hearing (Jan. 31, 1963) (transcript available at the 
Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Butler Library, Columbia University). 
 35. Communications, BULL. FOR BETTER MEC LAB. REL. (Midwest Em-
ployers Council, Inc., Omaha, Neb.), Feb. 19, 1960, at 3 (on file with the Rare 
Book and Manuscript Library, Butler Library, Columbia University). 
 36. Id. 
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beled the Midwest Employers Council, along with the John 
Birch Society, a “fascist trend” in the United States.37 
Tate codified for his clientele all the key antiunion tactics 
that Wal-Mart and so many other firms would later deploy. 
Among these were profit-sharing schemes designed to give em-
ployees a stake in the productivity of the enterprise,38 NLRB 
election delays that demoralized union advocates,39 a tough ne-
gotiating posture that leaves the workforce in limbo and with-
out a contract,40 and aggressive efforts to decertify unions al-
ready representing the workforce.41 Employer “free speech,” 
was the key element that made this strategy work, enabling 
executives to conduct compulsory meetings of the workforce 
and hold one-on-one interviews with employees.42 In addition, 
although the courts had ruled that an outright threat would be 
illegal, the free-speech doctrine allowed employers to imply 
that unionism would have disastrous consequences for the lives 
of all concerned.43 
Tate’s combativeness, soon standard fare for all his clients, 
was manifest in a 1959 captive audience speech he prepared for 
a warehouse employer facing a Teamster organizing drive:  
Remember this—no union can guarantee you anything! The law says 
that if you force us to deal with some outside third party—some union 
strangers, we have to bargain, but they law does not say we have to 
agree to a single solitary thing! If these union salesmen call you off of 
your jobs so you can’t pay your bills—the law says we can go right out 
and hire someone else to take your place. If we never reach an agree-
ment with the union, we never have to hire you back!44 
To all this divisiveness, Tate counterpoised a friendly and 
informal community, or as he wrote in a talk for employees of 
another business client who sought to decertify an existing un-
ion, “You can do as you wish. It is, thank God, a free country. I 
 
 37. AFL-CIO, UNITED PRESS INST., Sept. 24, 1963 (on file with the Rare 
Book and Manuscript Library, Butler Library, Columbia University). 
 38. See ORTEGA, supra note 6, at 89. 
 39. See PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE 39–40 (1990). 
 40. See Kate Bronfenbrenner, Raw Power: Plant-Closing Threats and the 
Threat to Union Organizing, MULTINATIONAL MONITOR, Dec. 2000, at 24, 28. 
 41. Telephone Interview with Duane Acklie, Former Partner, Nelson, 
Harding, Acklie, Manchese, Leonard, & Tate, in Lincoln, Neb. (May 29, 2007). 
 42. See, e.g., F.W. Woolworth Co., 251 N.L.R.B. 1111, 1113 (1980); see also 
Becker, supra note 16, at 560. 
 43. See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537–38 (1945); Fischer Governor 
Co., 71 N.L.R.B. 1291, 1295–96 (1946); Oval Wood Dish Corp., 62 N.L.R.B. 
1129, 1139 (1945); Telephone Interview with Duane Acklie, supra note 41. 
 44. John Tate, Address at Employee Meeting (June 1, 1959) (on file with 
the Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Butler Library, Columbia University). 
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do hope—and I don’t mind telling you, that you vote No Union, 
and we can sit down together to work out any problems we 
have.”45 
Tate’s reputation as an effective union fighter spread 
throughout the Midwest, especially after he founded Omaha’s 
largest labor relations law firm in 1967.46 Sam Walton called on 
him in 1972 when Wal-Mart faced union trouble at two stores 
in central Missouri.47 In truth, the St. Louis-based Retail 
Clerks Local had not put together much of an organizing drive. 
It threw together informational picket lines at a couple of 
stores, but the union put few resources into organizing them.48 
Wal-Mart executives, however, had made an embarrassing and 
illegal hash of their efforts to squash the union.49 As the NLRB 
would later note, Jack Shewmaker, one of Walton’s rising stars, 
had been overheard telling store manager Robert Haines that 
“if he caught any employees with union cards, he should fire 
them even if he had to hire all new employees.”50 Then, when 
Connie Kreyling, a young but highly competent office manager, 
began to talk up the union idea among her workmates, she was 
summarily fired by Haines when she arrived for work on a 
Monday morning.51 The Retail Clerks took her firing to the 
NLRB.52 There Haines was shown to be a liar—he claimed that 
he had fired Kreyling for poor work habits rather than “pro-
tected” union activity.53 The NLRB ordered Wal-Mart to rehire 
Kreyling and post “in conspicuous places” a “Notice to Em-
ployees” that asserted, “WE WILL NOT discourage membership 
in or activities on behalf of Retail Store Employees’ Union, Lo-
cal No. 655 . . . by discharging, or in any other manner discri-
minating in regard to hire or tenure of employment of any of 
our employees because of their union activities.”54 
 
 45. Bill Hoppe, Address at Employee Meeting (1961) (on file with the Rare 
Book and Manuscript Library, Butler Library, Columbia University). 
 46. Telephone Interview with Duane Acklie, supra note 41. 
 47. See ORTEGA, supra note 6, at 87–88. 
 48. Id. at 88–89. 
 49. See id. 
 50. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 201 N.L.R.B. 250, 251 (1973). 
 51. See id. 
 52. See id. at 250. 
 53. See id. at 252. 
 54. Id. 
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B. PROFIT SHARING: THEORY AND PRACTICE  
By this point Tate was in the store where his well-tested 
spiel, plus the judicious transfer of Haines to another store, 
ended once and for all the union buzz.55 However, the incident 
worried Walton, who asked Tate what could be done,56 especial-
ly now that his chain was rapidly establishing stores outside of 
Arkansas where rural poverty and Southern mores had made 
so many clerks grateful for a job with Mr. Sam.57 Tate told Wal-
ton, “You can hire me or someone like me to hold these people 
down, and fight them the rest of your life. Or you can decide to 
get them on your side.”58 This was the script Tate had long per-
fected. He proposed that Wal-Mart expand its profit-sharing 
plan, codify an open-door policy, and give the employees access 
to much store-level information on sales, profits, and inventory 
“shrinkage.”59 This became the kernel of Wal-Mart’s famous 
“We Care” program, an updated but inexpensive version of the 
corporate welfare schemes that had first flourished in the years 
immediately after the great strike wave of 1919.60  
Sam Walton and his publicists would later attribute much 
of the impulse for this idea to Walton’s spouse Helen, who told 
her husband that unless the clerks and cashiers “were on 
board, the top people might not last long either.”61 Profit shar-
ing was a generous yet common-sense way to spread Sam’s 
wealth among his hardworking and devoted employees.62 But 
in the early 1970s almost all policy makers, corporate benefit 
managers, and trade unionists considered the very idea of such 
a scheme economically problematic and ideologically retro-
grade. Most companies, unionized or not, offered their em-
ployees defined-benefit pension plans, which paid out a fixed 
monthly stipend at retirement based on their salary and years 
of service.63 Social Security was a fixed-benefit plan that the 
 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Cf. Moreton, supra note 8, at 80–82 (discussing the economic rational-
ization and employment appreciation in early Wal-Mart culture). 
 58. See ORTEGA, supra note 6, at 88. 
 59. Id. at 90. 
 60. Id. 
 61. SAM WALTON WITH JOHN HUEY, SAM WALTON: MADE IN AMERICA 129 
(1992). 
 62. See ORTEGA, supra note 6, at 349. 
 63. See Stephen F. Befort, The Perfect Storm of Retirement Insecurity: Fix-
ing the Three-Legged Stool of Social Security, Pensions, and Personal Savings, 
LICHTENSTEIN_4FMT 5/24/2008 11:39 AM 
1472 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [92:1462 
 
Nixon administration had just strengthened by indexing it to 
inflation.64 In 1974 came the Employee Retirement Income Se-
curity Act, designed to regulate private pension plans in order 
to make them a secure counterpart to Social Security.65 The in-
dividually controlled private retirement account—now ubiquit-
ous as the 401(k)—would not come into legal existence until 
1978 or into popular use until the mid-1980s.66 
Profit-sharing plans were not unknown in the early 1970s, 
but they had a distinctly right-wing odor, especially when subs-
tituted for a traditional pension. In an era when the idea of se-
curity—national, social, or union—still held much credence, 
profit-sharing schemes were a radical innovation, shifting risk 
to the employee and linking his or her fortunes directly and ex-
clusively to that of the firm for which they labored.67 In the 
1960s, Tate put together a number of such schemes for under-
capitalized Nebraska firms who were determined to prevent 
union activity inexpensively.68 One of the most famous plans, 
with which John Tate must have been familiar, was that of 
Sears, Roebuck & Co.,69 then the greatest retailer in the land.70 
With most of its assets invested in Sears stock, the plan paid 
out at least ten percent of all profits, with long-service em-
ployees, largely male, reaping the largest corporate contribu-
tions.71 Everyone watched the stock price, which Sears posted 
daily at every store and warehouse.72 The investment plan gen-
erated a sense of shared purpose and community, in the words 
of one executive, it was “the central unifying symbol around 
which the entire organization revolved.”73 The plan and the 
 
91 MINN. L. REV. 938, 948 (2007) (discussing the predominance of defined-
benefit savings plans in the 1970s). 
 64. See William G. Dauster, Protecting Social Security and Medicare, 33 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 461, 476 (1996); Michael Alan Paskin, Privatization of Old-
Age Pensions in Latin America: Lessons for Social Security Reform in the Unit-
ed States, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 2199, 2202 n.30 (1994). 
 65. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.). 
 66. See JACOB S. HACKER, THE GREAT RISK SHIFT 118–19 (2006). 
 67. For a discussion of the rise of “security” as a social good, see JENNIFER 
KLEIN, FOR ALL THESE RIGHTS: BUSINESS, LABOR, AND THE SHAPING OF 
AMERICA’S PUBLIC-PRIVATE WELFARE STATE 78–115 (2003). 
 68. Telephone Interview with Duane Acklie, supra note 41. 
 69. See JACOBY, supra note 19, at 39. 
 70. See ORTEGA, supra note 6, at 160. 
 71. See JACOBY, supra note 19, at 108. 
 72. See id. at 109. 
 73. Id. (quoting James C. Worthy, Assistant to Clarence B. Caldwell, 
Head of Sears’ Personnel Department from the 1930s to the 1950s). 
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ideology it embodied proved a bulwark against efforts by the 
Retail Clerks and the Teamsters to organize the big store in the 
1950s and early 1960s.74 
Wal-Mart’s scheme was a discount version of the Sears 
plan. It was not actually a profit-sharing plan. Rather, Wal-
Mart contributed approximately six percent of an employee’s 
wage to its plan75 dependent upon the degree to which Wal-
Mart hit certain predetermined earnings and profit targets.76 It 
required one year of service to kick in77 and seven years to fully 
vest. By the turn of the millennium the corporate contribution 
had dropped to about four percent as Wal-Mart growth slowed, 
“[t]hus only one Wal-Mart associate out of 50 ever accumulated 
$50,000 in stock.”78 Still, for those employees who remained 
with the company during the 1970s and 1980s, when the stock 
price leaped upward, the profit-sharing plan reaped huge divi-
dends.79 In 1990, Wal-Mart World bragged that ninety-three 
associates had retired in the past year with more than 
$100,000 in each of their accounts.80  
But as Tate understood, the most important impact of the 
profit-sharing scheme was ideological, linking the employees to 
the fate of the company,81 but also justifying the self-
exploitation that was integral to the Wal-Mart culture. “Store 
associates are willing to work long years for modest pay and 
slim wage hikes content on knowing they will hold small for-
tunes in Wal-Mart stock upon retirement.”82 
A company profit-sharing executive put it even more poin-
tedly in 1990:  
Your profit sharing account balance will depend upon how well you 
and every associate in our company does his or her job. There is no 
place for coasters or people just half-way doing their jobs—just as 
there is no place for shrinkage or other needless expenses. People who 
don’t do their jobs take dollars out of your profit sharing . . . .83 
 
 74. Id. 
 75. See WALTON WITH HUEY, supra note 61, at 132. 
 76. See id. at 132; ORTEGA, supra note 6, at 349. 
 77. WALTON WITH HUEY, supra note 61, at 132. 
 78. See ORTEGA, supra note 6, at 349. 
 79. See id. at 209–10, 349. 
 80. Debbie Davis Cambell, Wal-Mart Associates Receive Largest Company 
Contribution Ever! $90 Million Added to Our Profit Sharing Fund!!, WAL-
MART WORLD (Wal-Mart, Inc., Bentonville, Ark.), Apr. 1990, at 16, 17. 
 81. See ORTEGA, supra note 6, at 349. 
 82. Still the Darling of Wall Street, DISCOUNT STORE NEWS, June 15, 
1992, at 137, 137. 
 83. Cambell, supra note, 80, at 18. 
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Although Walton boasted that more than four out of five 
Wal-Mart workers owned company stock,84 massive turnover at 
the bottom of the organization made profit sharing a scheme 
that enriched only those with long tenure or high wages,85 es-
pecially after 2000 when Wal-Mart’s stock price went no-
where.86 Thus, a store manager complained to Wal-Mart officer 
H. Lee Scott in 2005, “My associates—especially the long-term 
ones—would really like a full explanation as to why we as the 
largest company on the planet cannot offer some type of re-
duced benefits. All we really get aside from our hard-earned 
profit sharing and 401(k) is a discount card.”87 Scott’s uncha-
racteristically hostile response, offered on an ostensibly confi-
dential corporate e-mail hookup, found the very question some-
thing close to treasonous. Scott replied, “this is a store manager 
who has a problem. . . . I worry about him representing all of us 
in management to his associates.”88 Wal-Mart was not going to 
go the way of General Motors, argued Scott and become “a ben-
efit company that sells cars to fund those benefits.”89 Sure, 
there is “a health care mess in this country,” admitted Scott, 
but until the government gets involved, managers who wanted 
to “take billions of dollars out of earnings and put this in retiree 
health benefits . . . should look for [another] company where 
you can do those kinds of things.”90 
C. STICKS AND CARROTS IN LOGISTICS  
Profit sharing was never going to be enough to keep Wal-
Mart union-free, especially among those young, blue-collar men 
whose labor was absolutely vital to the company’s rapidly ex-
panding logistics system. Indeed, the 1970s had been an Indian 
summer for unionism in the south-central states. The Team-
sters, among the most powerful unions in this region, still had 
 
 84. See WALTON WITH HUEY, supra note 61, at 132. 
 85. See ORTEGA, supra note 6, at 90. 
 86. Parija B. Kavilanz, Wal-Mart Slows U.S. Expansion; Stock Jumps, 
CNNMONEY.COM, June 1, 2007, http://money.cnn.com/2007/06/01/news/ 
companies/walmart/index.htm. (“Wal-Mart's stock price has been stuck in a 
range between $45 and $60 over the past seven years.”). 
 87. Posting of H. Lee Scott to Lee’s Garage (Apr. 1, 2005), available at 
http://walmartwatch.com/blog/archives/wal_mart_managers_leak_more_ 
documents/ (follow “2005” hyperlink). 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id.; see also Steven Greenhouse & Michael Barbaro, On Private Web 
Site, Wal-Mart Chief Talks Tough, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2006, at C1. 
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more than two million members nationwide.91 In Little Rock, 
St. Louis, and Kansas City, aggressive locals were organizing 
the warehousemen and truckers who worked for the wholesa-
lers and supermarkets of the region. Despite much well-
publicized corruption at the top of their organization,92 these 
locals were vigilant enforcers of their contracts, which for over-
the-road drivers were not much inferior to those negotiated by 
the militants of Chicago and Detroit.93 And this was an era of 
unprecedented visibility, even prestige, for the long-distance 
trucker, whose CB radio slang and working-class persona be-
came, for a brief moment, brightly textured threads in the cul-
ture of popular, populist Americana.94 
But at Wal-Mart, these blue-collar drivers and ware-
housemen felt themselves slighted, their dignity and manhood 
called into question. In the 1970s, when Walton and his CEO 
Ron Meyer, were setting up the company logistics system, con-
fusion, speed-up, and poor wages dogged the rapidly expanding 
system of distribution centers and the trucks that serviced 
them.95 “We were always behind with our distribution,” re-
membered Thomas Jefferson, who was in charge of the first 
distribution centers,96 “We never opened a warehouse soon 
enough, and we always had too many stores to service before 
the warehouse would get opened.”97 As a consequence, sixty-
hour weeks were routine, trailers and trucks were backed up, 
and the drivers were expected to lend a hand with the loading 
and unloading, even after a hard day on the road.98 Warehouse 
wages were far lower than those blue-collar workers could 
command in nearby Missouri and Texas, while the wages of 
truck drivers were pegged to those who hauled product for Ty-
 
 91. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, The Teamster Century: 
1970s: Growth Slows, http://www.teamster.org/resources/members/1970s.htm 
(last visited Apr. 14, 2008) (“In 1976, Teamsters membership topped the two 
million mark.”). 
 92. See ORTEGA, supra note 6, at 106. 
 93. See generally DAN LABOTZ, RANK-AND-FILE REBELLION: TEAMSTERS 
FOR A DEMOCRATIC UNION 19–150 (1990) (discussing the negotiations and con-
tracts of the Teamsters).  
 94. SHANE HAMILTON, TRUCKING COUNTRY: THE ROAD TO AMERICA’S 
WAL-MART ECONOMY (forthcoming 2008); Telephone Interview with Ronald 
Heath, Former Teamsters Organizer, in Bentonville, Ark. (Aug. 22, 2006). 
 95. WALTON WITH HUEY, supra note 61, at 121–25. 
 96. See id. at 122. 
 97. Id.  
 98. See ORTEGA, supra note 6, at 100. 
LICHTENSTEIN_4FMT 5/24/2008 11:39 AM 
1476 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [92:1462 
 
son Farms, the nonunion, hard-scrabble, chicken-processing 
operation also headquartered in Northwest Arkansas.99 
The Teamsters therefore launched organizing efforts at 
company distribution centers in Bentonville and Searcy during 
the late 1970s and early 1980s.100 Each of these distribution 
centers employed about eight hundred warehousemen in condi-
tions that were more akin to a fast-paced factory than a pink-
collar store. Accidents were frequent and overtime was enorm-
ous.101 In 1980 and 1981 some Searcy distribution center em-
ployees “even slept in their cars in the parking lot between 
double shifts.”102 At Searcy, where the Teamsters were most ac-
tive, warehouseman Randy Powell told reporters, “all we’re 
asking right now is the right to negotiate hours, wages, and 
working conditions. They claim we have that now on an indi-
vidual basis, but when you’re one of 38,000 [employees] they’re 
not going to hear you.”103 The Teamsters seemed to have made 
a decisive inroad; nearly half the workers at Searcy had signed 
union cards.104 
Wal-Mart executives took off the gloves. An NLRB election 
was scheduled for February 1982,105 so the shadow cast by Ro-
nald Reagan’s destruction of the Professional Air Traffic Con-
trollers Organization the previous August remained long, deep, 
and dark.106 When Walton and his brother Bud flew down to 
Searcy just before the election, the company founder assembled 
the workers to tell them “he’d strip them of their profit-sharing 
if they voted for the union.”107 Walton told them he had five 
hundred job applications on file, some from the evangelical, an-
tiunion students at nearby Harding College.108 Warming to the 
subject, he offered a threat that was then and now an explicit 
violation of the labor law: “He told us that if the union got in, 
 
 99. See Telephone Interview with Ronald Heath, supra note 94. 
 100. See ORTEGA, supra note 6, at 93. 
 101. See id. at 106. 
 102. Id. at 105. 
 103. Id. at 106. 
 104. Id. 
 105. See id. at 107. 
 106. See generally Bernard D. Meltzer & Cass R. Sunstein, Public Em-
ployee Strikes, Executive Discretion, and the Air Traffic Controllers, 50 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 731 (1983) (recounting the history and legal ramifications of President 
Reagan’s handling of the PATCO strike). 
 107. See ORTEGA, supra note 6, at 107. 
 108. See VANCE H. TRIMBLE, SAM WALTON: THE INSIDE STORY OF AMERI-
CA’S RICHEST MAN 230 (1990); Telephone Interview with Ronald Heath, supra 
note 94. 
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the warehouse would be closed. . . . He said people could vote 
any way they wanted, but he’d close her right up.”109 
Meanwhile, John Tate stirred this fearful pot with a prop-
aganda barrage that has since become a classic in the anti-
union arsenal. Workers want justice, but not divisiveness; they 
seek harmony and cooperation, as well as dignity at work; they 
organize for a voice on the job, not a strike that puts them out-
side on the picket lines.110 Antiunion strategists like Tate had 
long been well aware of these social and psychological needs, so 
they turned them against the union impulse, promising vi-
olence, division, conflict, and an immediate strike if workers 
cast their lot with the union.111 Workers arriving at the Searcy 
distribution center one morning found Tate’s rendition of this 
antiunion stratagem in the form of a ninety-foot-long bulletin 
board, covered with four decades worth of newspaper clippings 
describing “every Teamster strike, violent incident and allega-
tion of criminality that Tate’s researchers had been able to 
piece together.”112 It was headlined, “Walk the 90-Foot Walk of 
Teamster Shame,” according to former Teamster Organizer 
Ronald Heath, who ran the Teamster’s local “organizing cam-
paign” in Little Rock.113 
Not unexpectedly, the Teamsters lost the election, after 
which Walton gloated in Wal-Mart World, “our good associates 
at our Searcy distribution center rejected the union by an 
overwhelming margin of over three to one. Bless them all. . . . 
We will never need a union in Wal-Mart if we work with and 
for one another and keep listening to each other.”114 It was a 
decisive, historic defeat. The Teamsters failed to contest the 
election and the hard-core unionists were soon eased out of the 
Searcy distribution center.115 The Arkansas labor movement 
and the Teamsters never renewed the struggle. That, in turn, 
sent a signal to the AFL-CIO in Washington that, for the mo-
ment, Wal-Mart was too difficult to tackle and that company 
 
 109. ORTEGA, supra note 6, at 107 (conveying one of the worker’s recollec-
tions); see also TRIMBLE, supra note 108, at 230; Telephone Interview with Ro-
nald Heath, supra note 94. 
 110. For an overview of Walton and Tate’s view of unions, see generally 
WALTON WITH HUEY, supra note 61, at 129–31. 
 111. See ORTEGA, supra note 6, at 88. 
 112. Id. at 106. 
 113. Telephone Interview with Ronald Heath, supra note 94. 
 114. TRIMBLE, supra note 108, at 230 (quoting an Arkansas Gazette story 
reprinting Walton’s Wal-Mart World statements). 
 115. See ORTEGA, supra note 6, at 108. 
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employees, in both the distribution centers and the stores, were 
too satisfied, complacent, or fearful to organize. 
But this turmoil in the Arkansas distribution centers did 
have a lasting consequence for at least a slice of the Wal-Mart 
workforce. The truck drivers were an absolutely vital link in 
Wal-Mart’s increasingly sophisticated supply chain.116 Each 
day they followed a carefully plotted road script that got them 
from the distribution center to the store and back in the short-
est time, burning the least amount of gas.117 The timely com-
pletion of their task was vital since these drivers—who would 
eventually number more than ten thousand—needed to arrive 
at their designated Wal-Mart store at an appointed moment 
each evening so that the overnight stocking staff could unload 
the truck.118 If they were not on schedule, money was lost and 
confusion reigned.119 
Wal-Mart management was therefore determined to conso-
lidate their allegiance and commitment. Even as the deregula-
tion of the larger trucking industry turned many over-the-road 
trucks, especially those of the owner-operators, into “sweat-
shops on wheels,” Wal-Mart drivers were elevated to something 
close to a labor aristocracy.120 By the early 1980s, Wal-Mart put 
their wages at a scale equal to that of union drivers. In Missis-
sippi and some other southern states, this meant that they 
were earning triple the pay of a state highway patrolman, or 
five times that of an hourly sales clerk. Equally important to 
many truckers, the word went out that drivers were no longer 
required to help load and unload their shipment. Their uni-
forms were now always clean, their equipment the best in the 
business.121 “We drop, hook, and drive. We don’t load and un-
load,” bragged a self-satisfied driver when interviewed by Dis-
count Store News late in the 1990s.122 
The drivers, an almost entirely white, male fraternity, de-
veloped a strong esprit de corps, even a certain arrogance to-
 
 116. See HAMILTON, supra note 94. 
 117. See Delivering Low Prices, DISCOUNT STORE NEWS, Oct. 1999, at 115, 
169 (recounting a day in the life of a Wal-Mart truck driver). 
 118. See ORTEGA, supra note 6, at 128–29. 
 119. Delivering Low Prices, supra note 117, at 169. 
 120. See generally MICHAEL H. BELZER, SWEATSHOPS ON WHEELS: WIN-
NERS AND LOSERS IN TRUCKING DEREGULATION (2000) (describing the effects 
of massive deregulation in the trucking industry). 
 121. Interview with Morgan “Chip” Welch, Esq., Partner, Welch & Kitch-
ens, L.L.C., in Little Rock, Ark. (June 5, 2006). 
 122. Delivering Low Prices, supra note 117, at 169. 
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ward rival truckers or other Wal-Mart employees, both manag-
ers and associates.123 Turnover rates for these long-haul 
ers, which sometimes reached one hundred percent in the non-
union cartage industry, never left the single digits at Wal-
Mart.124 Accidents involving Wal-Mart trucks, frequently a 
costly and litigious affair, were rare, with Wal-Mart drivers 
prideful of their safety record.125 And even more vital to the 
company, Wal-Mart achieved a 99.8% on-time delivery stan-
dard for its stores, a truly astounding figure.126  
But not all who worked in logistics were admitted to this 
labor aristocracy. Wal-Mart’s growing list of distribution cen-
ters required a lot of staffing, and unlike the truck drivers, who 
always enjoyed a degree of highway autonomy, the blue-collar 
men who ran the fork lifts and threw boxes into the truck trai-
lers were not going to receive any special privileges.127 As the 
depth and precision of logistic computerization leaped forward, 
their work was increasingly supervised, their every working 
hour monitored and regulated.128 They were paid more than the 
cashiers and clerks, enough to avoid a debilitating labor short-
age at the distribution centers, but no more than necessary.129 
When a Searcy warehouseman asked Walton why they were 
getting paid $1.50 less an hour than those in a newly opened 
Texas facility, Sam replied forthrightly that he could hire them 
for less in Arkansas.130 Wal-Mart has often sited its distribu-
tion centers in rural areas with a high degree of underemploy-
ment, even if this puts them at a considerable distance from the 
interstate.131 
D. WAL-MART V. UNION AMERICA 
In the stores, Wal-Mart’s strategy followed a similar path. 
Until the mid-1980s, Wal-Mart avoided metropolitan America 
 
 123. Interview with Morgan “Chip” Welch, Esq., supra note 121. 
 124. Supply Chain Power Heart of EDLP Success, MASS MARKET RETAIL-
ERS (Dec. 17, 2001). 
 125. See Delivering Low Prices, supra note 117, at 169. 
 126. See Supply Chain Power Heart of EDLP Success, supra note 124. 
 127. See ORTEGA, supra note 6, at 106. 
 128. For a more extensive discussion of trucking Taylorization, see general-
ly BELZER, supra note 120. 
 129. See TRIMBLE, supra note 108, at 230. 
 130. ORTEGA, supra note 6, at 107. 
 131. See James R. Held, Distribution Center: Site Selection, ECON. DEV. J., 
Summer 2003, at 31, 33–34.  
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whenever possible,132 where U.S. trade unions had their great-
est strength.133 In Missouri, for example, where trade unionists 
were strong enough to defeat a “Right-to-Work” referendum in 
1978,134 Wal-Mart built scores of stores, but all were in small 
towns or in the ex-urban ring that skirted union strongholds 
like St. Louis and Kansas City. And this was the Wal-Mart pat-
tern throughout the Midwest, even as U.S. trade unionism en-
countered an increasingly hostile political and social environ-
ment, first sent reeling by the deindustrialization of the old 
union strongholds and then slapped hard by Ronald Reagan.135 
Wal-Mart had a great deal of success in dealing with un-
ions. By the 1990s the battle was about to be joined as the na-
tion’s largest retailer put its grocery-selling “Supercenters” in 
traditional union strongholds like Wisconsin, Minnesota, Mich-
igan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and California.136 Supermarkets 
were a big, successful business in the postwar United States. 
By the end of the twentieth century they employed nearly 2.5 
million workers.137 With 1.3 million members, the United Food 
and Commercial Workers (UFCW) had organized about 800,000 
of these workers in chains that represented just over half of all 
supermarket sales.138 Union wages in this industry never ap-
proached those once paid in the muscular core of the old manu-
facturing economy, but they were enough to sustain a modest, 
recognizably middle-class standard of living.139 Most surveys 
put labor costs in the unionized grocery stores at about thirty 
percent above those paid by Wal-Mart.140 Wages were indeed 
 
 132. See ORTEGA, supra note 6, at 149. 
 133. Cf. DANIEL NELSON, SHIFTING FORTUNES: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF 
AMERICAN LABOR, FROM THE 1820S TO THE PRESENT 149–52 (1997) (recount-
ing the general decline in the fortunes of trade unions in the 1970s and 1980s). 
 134. GALL, supra note 9, at 202. 
 135. See Meltzer & Sunstein, supra note 106, at 731. 
 136. See ORTEGA, supra note 6, at 231. 
 137. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, MAY 2004 NA-
TIONAL INDUSTRY-SPECIFIC OCCUPATIONAL EMPLOYMENT AND WAGE ESTI-
MATES (2004), http://www.bls.gov/oes/2004/May/naics4_445100.htm (last vi-
sited Apr. 14, 2008). 
 138. United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Who We 
Are, http://www.ufcw.org/about_ufcw/who_we_are/index.cfm (last visited Apr. 
14, 2007); see also ERIN JOHANSSON, WAL-MART: ROLLING BACK WORKERS’ 
WAGES, RIGHTS, AND THE AMERICAN DREAM: AN AMERICAN RIGHTS AT WORK 
REPORT 15 (2005), available at http://www.wakeupwalmart.com/facts/ 
amrightsatwork.pdf. 
 139. See JOHANSSON, supra note 138, at 15. 
 140. See ARINDRAJIT DUBE & KEN JACOBS, HIDDEN COST OF WAL-MART 
JOBS: USE OF SAFETY NET PROGRAMS BY WAL-MART WORKERS IN CALIFORNIA 
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higher, but the qualitative difference between Wal-Mart and its 
unionized competitors came in terms of those elements of the 
paycheck that made a real career possible: full-time jobs, de-
fined benefit pensions, adequate family health insurance, and a 
seniority system that facilitated a steady progression through a 
series of higher paying and more responsible jobs.141 
The UFCW, which was itself the product of a series of mer-
gers in the 1960s and 1970s among unions representing pack-
inghouse and food processing workers, furriers, meat cutters, 
and retail clerks, had succeeded in quietly organizing much of 
the postwar era’s booming supermarket industry.142 Many su-
permarket chains, which had established a near monopoly 
within their own metropolitan region, were not adverse to un-
ionization, especially if a modest wage standard applied both to 
themselves as well as their competitors.143 Thus for more than 
half a century, locals of the UFCW, or one of its predecessor un-
ions, bargained uneventfully with regional chains such as 
Giant in the Washington area, Pathmark in New York and 
New Jersey, Stop and Shop in New England, Ralph’s in South-
ern California, Fred Meyer in Seattle, and the Star Markets of 
Boston. The union won excellent health insurance benefits and 
a good pension scheme. 
But this regional success had a downside. The UFCW re-
mained highly decentralized.144 It did little to coordinate orga-
nizing among its jealously autonomous locals.145 Indeed, since 
Wal-Mart was not on the radar of most of the big metropolitan 
locals, the UFCW barely noticed the rapidly growing discoun-
ter. In the early 1990s, however, when Wal-Mart began to build 
hundreds of grocery-selling Supercenters, often sited in the 
suburbs right down the street from a union supermarket, the 
UFCW became alarmed. 
Wal-Mart’s Supercenters were a sensation, something gen-
uinely new in a supermarket business approaching middle age. 
 
4–5 (U.C. Berkeley Center for Labor Research and Education, Aug. 2, 2004), 
available at http://laborcenter.berkeley.edu/retail/walmart.pdf. 
 141. See JOHANSSON, supra note 138, at 15–16. 
 142. See ORTEGA, supra note 6, at 229. 
 143. See RICHARD TEDLOW, NEW AND IMPROVED: THE STORY OF MASS 
MARKETING IN AMERICA 220–21 (1990). 
 144. See ROGER HOROWITZ, “NEGRO AND WHITE, UNITE AND FIGHT!”: A SO-
CIAL HISTORY OF INDUSTRIAL UNIONISM IN MEATPACKING, 1930–1990, at 265 
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 145. See HOROWITZ, supra note 144, at 265–75. 
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By adding a full line of groceries to the discount store format, 
Wal-Mart not only burst onto the scene in a trillion-dollar in-
dustry, but it also ramped up its general merchandise sales by 
about thirty percent in each grocery-selling store. This was tru-
ly one-stop shopping.146 Wal-Mart put Supercenters on the map 
at a furious clip: 113 in 1998, 157 in 1999, and 167 in 2000.147 
By the end of the next year, a thousand Supercenters has been 
built and Wal-Mart commanded the number one spot in the 
U.S. grocery market.148 “Wal-Mart Is Eating Everybody’s 
Lunch,” pronounced Business Week.149 And its cost advantage 
over traditional supermarkets was potentially even greater 
than that which it enjoyed against traditional retail chains like 
Woolworth and Penny’s. The supermarkets had once been the 
epitome of efficient mass retailing, whose executives boasted of 
the industry’s one or two percent profit margin.150 But the big 
grocery chains had never really taken control of their supply 
chains; indeed, their suppliers often controlled a large slice of 
the display space within the supermarket itself.151 A Byzantine 
system of “vendor allowances,” which were really kickbacks, de-
termined everything: how an item was promoted, the shelf 
space it commanded, sales volume, and price.152 Although prof-
itable in the short run, these allowances added enormous com-
plexity and rigidity to the procurement process. Wal-Mart 
would have nothing to do with them.153 
Even more important, Wal-Mart held a decisive competi-
tive advantage over the supermarkets when it came to labor 
costs, which were often nearly seventy percent of the operating 
budget.154 When Wal-Mart was competing against nonunion 
Kmart and Target, its cost of labor was marginally lower, but 
in the grocery business, unionized stores paid wages and bene-
fits that were at least thirty percent higher than those paid at 
 
 146. See Jack Neff, Bentonville or Bust: As Wal-Mart’s Presence in Food 
Grows, Will All Career Paths Lead to Arkansas?, FOOD PROCESSING, Mar. 
2003, at 30, 30–33. 
 147. Id. at 32. 
 148. See Robert Brenner, Wal-Mart Is Eating Everybody’s Lunch, BUS. 
WK., Apr. 15, 2002, at 43. 
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 150. Julie Rawe, Supermarket Smackdown, TIME, May 3, 2004, Bonus Sec-
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Wal-Mart.155 The UFCW was caught in the squeeze, both by 
Wal-Mart, which put unionized firms out of business, and by 
the old-line grocery chains themselves, who were determined to 
hold the line on their wage-and-benefit costs to meet the chal-
lenge from Wal-Mart.156 In the Midwest, Kroger was hurting; in 
the South, Piggly Wiggly would soon be forced out of business; 
and, in California, Safeway began to slash office staff and pre-
pare for battle with its unions. In Las Vegas, Wal-Mart opened 
sixteen stores in the 1990s, which led to the demise of Raley’s, 
a unionized, California-based grocery chain that operated eigh-
teen supermarkets in southern Nevada.157 All were shuttered 
by the end of 2002, leading to the loss of 1400 jobs.158 In all, 
Wal-Mart proved the catalyst for the closure of thirteen thou-
sand traditional supermarkets and the bankruptcy of at least 
twenty-five regional grocery chains between 1992 and 2003.159  
The UFCW effort to organize Wal-Mart was therefore es-
sentially defensive. And like any entrenched formation, the big 
grocery union had certain tactical advantages. It was one of the 
few U.S. trade unions that could still organize. The work of its 
members could not be outsourced to Mexico or China, so the 
fear of job loss was not an immediate worry when organizers 
approached potential new recruits.160 Safely ensconced within 
the booming service sector, UFCW membership actually grew 
by one hundred thousand during the 1980s and early 1990s.161 
At Wal-Mart, the union adopted an opportunistic organizing 
strategy, supporting workers wherever a few union sparkplugs 
could be found.162 
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On its face, this strategy could never win, certainly not in 
terms of traditional union-management conflict and compro-
mise. UFCW organizing victories at a handful of scattered sites 
were unlikely to make much of an impression on corporate ex-
ecutives. But the union hoped that the publicity that the cam-
paign generated would force Wal-Mart to raise wages, improve 
its health insurance, and encourage the growth of union-
community collaborations against the giant retailer.163 Even 
more important, the UFCW wanted to demonstrate that Wal-
Mart’s violation of the labor law was so widespread and so sys-
tematic that the NLRB should impose an “extraordinary na-
tionwide remedy” against the company.164 The NLRB’s sanc-
tions in unfair labor practice cases are generally local and 
narrowly drawn, but when an employer repeatedly uses the 
same stratagems across the country, the NLRB may impose 
broader, nationwide penalties.165 Such sanctions could have 
had a real impact on the way Wal-Mart deployed its antiunion 
phalanx. Thus, the UFCW barraged the NLRB with allegations 
of unfair labor practices against the company.166 By 2001 it 
seemed possible that the NLRB could have given Wal-Mart a 
serious company-wide penalty.167 But Wal-Mart circumvented 
the entire process by appealing straight to the White House, 
where the Bush Republicans disliked a highly politicized labor 
movement almost as much as the big retailer.168 Just days be-
fore Wal-Mart was set to defend itself before the NLRB, Leo-
nard Page, the union-friendly general council for the NLRB, 
took a phone call from the White House.169 He had “36 hours to 
clear out his office.”170 Page’s more conservative “successor de-
cided against bringing a national complaint against Wal-
Mart.”171  
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Indeed, the deck was stacked against the union. Although 
Wal-Mart could not move its stores overseas, it could transform 
the technology or organization of a job to eliminate the workers 
who were potential union recruits.172 This was an old manage-
ment stratagem that had eviscerated trade unionism in news-
paper press rooms, tobacco processing factories, wireless tele-
communications, and a large slice of the broadcast industry. 
Wal-Mart adopted the same kind of technological fix after nine 
meat cutters won a 2000 NLRB election in a Jacksonville, Tex-
as Supercenter.173 When Wal-Mart got word of the unexpected 
union inroad at Jacksonville, the company cauterized the 
wound in the most radical fashion. Henceforth, Wal-Mart an-
nounced that it would cease cutting meat in its stores altogeth-
er.174 This was almost certainly a form of illegal retaliation 
against its newly union-certified butchers.175 But for Wal-Mart, 
that was an insignificant detail that could and would languish 
in the courts. Of far greater import was the company’s decision 
to become the first big grocery chain to adopt a new system of 
buying “case-ready” beef and pork prepackaged by the meat-
packer.176 For Wal-Mart, this technological fix tightened up the 
corporate supply chain even as it eliminated a point of union 
vulnerability.177 The Cattle Buyers Weekly called Wal-Mart’s 
move “the single biggest change in the history of meat retail-
ing.”178 
But Jacksonville was the exception. When it came to trade 
unionism, Wal-Mart rarely had to make such a structural read-
justment to fight the threat from organized labor. Its defenses 
were elaborate and multilayered, like the intersecting lines of 
cannon fire that protected a well-constructed fortress. By the 
time the UFCW began its effort to organize Wal-Mart in the 
late 1990s, union-avoidance strategies, at Wal-Mart and other 
corporations, had advanced since John Tate and Sam Walton 
browbeat the Searcy warehousemen two decades before. An en-
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tire antiunion industry had grown up in the United States 
since the 1970s when the lawyers and consultants who orches-
trated such work were thought to be just a step or two above 
ambulance chasers and bail-bond salesmen.179 But President 
Reagan’s celebration of the market and the entrepreneur dur-
ing his White House years legitimized an ideological and opera-
tional hostility to organized labor at just the moment when 
sharper competition at home and abroad had convinced many 
businessmen that the unionized workplace was both too expen-
sive and too inflexible.180 So a flourishing set of consultants, 
law firms, personnel psychologists, and strike management 
firms peddled their services during an era when it was finally 
possible, in the north and west as well as the rural south, to 
promote what one consultant called the “morality of a union-
free environment.”181  
Most companies outsource antiunion work. When corporate 
executives get wind of a union-organizing drive or some other 
indication of discontent, they pick up the phone, negotiate a 
price, sign the contract and let the consultants and lawyers 
play a large role in running the company until the threat 
passes.182 At a cost that often reaches several million dollars for 
a few months’ work, these union busters deploy a well-tested 
set of stratagems to ensure that their new client is kept union-
free.183 First, the lower-level supervisory staff is assembled and 
told that they have been drafted into the antiunion effort: any 
equivocation or desertion will result in instant dismissal, if only 
because these “managers” have no protection under existing in-
terpretations of U.S. labor law. Then comes a barrage of leaf-
lets, videos, personnel shifts, and meetings with individual em-
ployees, often climaxed with an on-site visit by top corporate 
executives. Captive-audience assemblies become more frequent 
and more intimidating as the presumptive date of the NLRB 
election draws near. Should the union manage to eke out an 
election victory, another round of delay and resistance begins, 
often continued by the same law firm that orchestrated the an-
tiunion campaign in the first place.184 This process is expensive 
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but highly effective: union organizing efforts using traditional 
labor law procedures have almost ground to a halt in the Unit-
ed States. Only about one union campaign in twenty ends with 
a signed collective bargaining contract. 
II.  HOW WAL-MART WINS   
Wal-Mart does all this and more, in-house, with its own 
people taking on the key tasks, thus making all the techniques 
and stratagems developed by the union avoidance experts an 
integral, organic part of the Wal-Mart culture.185 This begins 
with a forthright assertion that Wal-Mart is antiunion, codified 
for Wal-Mart managers in training manuals.186 As Wal-Mart 
came under high levels of scrutiny in the 1990s, the company 
ritually announced, “We are not antiunion; we are pro-
associate.”187 But company manuals for store and distribution 
center managers were otherwise far more explicit, “Staying un-
ion free is a full-time commitment,” announced a 1991 version 
of a distribution center training manual.188 “[F]rom the Chair-
person of the ‘Board’ down to the front-line manager,” reads the 
manual, “[n]o one in management is immune from carrying his 
or her ‘own weight’ in the union prevention effort. The entire 
management staff should fully comprehend and appreciate ex-
actly what is expected of their individual efforts to meet the un-
ion free objective.”189 
Wal-Mart CEO Tom Coughlin, who in 2000 was number 
two in the corporate hierarchy, embodied an approach that was 
truly that of the iron fist inside the velvet glove. Coughlin, who 
had been tutored by the hard-line John Tate in Wal-Mart’s an-
tiunion ethos, continued Wal-Mart’s efforts to defeat the UFCW 
whenever it reared its head inside Wal-Mart’s world.190 To his 
staff and to middle-level management he was uncompromising: 
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“These union issues are going to get worse,” he told a Benton-
ville staff meeting in March 2000, so managers should quickly 
identify the most “fertile ground for unions” amongst the Wal-
Mart associates and immediately report back to Bentonville.191 
Then the regional vice presidents and district managers must 
ensure that all labor relations directives are “executed 100%! 
[There is n]o room or tolerance for slippage.”192 
Coughlin and other Wal-Mart executives always referred to 
unions as “third-party representatives.”193 This was a world 
view driven home during a new employee’s very first day on the 
payroll. A Wal-Mart training video, “You’ve Picked a Great 
Place to Work!” effectively makes the point.194 Through a con-
versation among a human resources manager; two newly hired 
workers, including a former union member; and two current 
workers, of whom one also previously belonged to a union, the 
video pounds home Wal-Mart’s disdain for trade unionism and 
the terrible consequences that befall workers and businesses 
that succumb to union blandishments. In just twenty-seven 
well-acted minutes the video encapsulates a generation of 
right-wing imagery and propaganda designed to demonize and 
marginalize the trade union idea. Absent is any denunciation of 
unions as Communist or radical; rather they are portrayed as 
essentially corrupt and parasitical institutions, marginal busi-
nesses, not unlike pawn brokers or pay-day lenders, who are 
primarily concerned with the dues income generated by any set 
of naïve workers seduced by their promises. 
Wal-Mart’s video portrays the unions as “political” but not 
ideological, spending dues money on “political campaigns” for 
candidates who workers “don’t even vote for,” and “to pay union 
bigwigs and their lawyers.” And the “politics” extends to the in-
ternal life of the workplace itself: work rules base promotions 
on “seniority or union politics,” rather than merit; union proce-
dures prohibit members from communicating directly with 
management and require workers “to go to your union stew-
ard,” who will relay the message to management only “if he 
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likes what you say.” And most importantly, the union is ineffec-
tive or worse. Strikes—frequent, violent, and divisive—are cer-
tain to be lost, likewise “every benefit . . . could go on the nego-
tiating table” and “unions will negotiate just about anything to 
get the right to have dues deducted from your paychecks.”  
Of course such propaganda is hardly enough, so Wal-Mart 
kept a close watch on what its workers think about their jobs, 
their bosses, the company, and themselves. The “employee atti-
tude survey” had long been a staple of the nonunion workplace. 
Sears had perfected the system in the 1950s when it employed 
skilled social scientists to ferret out nodes of discontent, and 
discontented employees, before they could metastasize into a 
spreading union cancer.195 Antiunion consulting firms made 
heavy use of such surveys from the 1980s onward.196 
Wal-Mart adopted a down-home approach to such surveys, 
which may well have made them even more effective. In the 
early 1970s, Sam Walton’s company took the pulse of its work-
ers by hosting an annual “grass roots” meeting for selected as-
sociates, during which top management heard complaints and 
exchanged ideas.197 Meetings were eventually held in every 
store.198 By 1994, Wal-Mart replaced these grass-roots meet-
ings with a sixty-eight question survey of the same name.199 
This scientifically designed, web-based survey provided data on 
employee morale according to job, gender, ethnicity, age, length 
of service, and hours of work. The top-five problems uncovered 
were always inadequate pay, the cost of health insurance, 
management favoritism, poor training, and the company policy 
that forced employees to relocate if they wanted a promotion in-
to management ranks.200  
Bentonville’s computers also manipulated the data to gen-
erate something Wal-Mart called a “UPI,” which originally 
stood for Union Probability Index, later renamed Unaddressed 
People Issues.201 About twenty percent of all Wal-Mart stores 
generate a UPI high enough to signal low morale, and therefore 
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require the attention of company executives whose job it was to 
keep unionism at bay.202 “Maintaining high morale in a facility 
is crucial to remaining union free,” is the way Wal-Mart’s Pipe-
line, its Intranet for store mangers, put it in a confidential 
message to all store managers.203 “If a union organizer ap-
proaches an associate in a facility with low morale, the asso-
ciate may believe the organizer’s ‘sales pitch.’”204 Store manag-
ers who presided over a facility with a high UPI were 
vulnerable to transfer or demotion.  
Of course, actually raising morale was either far too expen-
sive or far too disruptive for the Mart-Mart business model. 
The top two worker grievances were all about money, and the 
rest challenged corporate authoritarianism. The Manager’s 
Toolbox did identify “Wal-Mart’s Open Door policy [as] our 
greatest barrier to union influences trying to change our corpo-
rate culture and union-free status.”205 But the open door was 
but another part of the paternalistic culture, “a morale tool to 
enhance the Wal-Mart family image” according to one disgrun-
tled store manager who was advised to minimize the time she 
spent on the “typical Associate concern or complaint.”206 
Wal-Mart’s own store managers and assistant managers 
were both the front line troops and potential traitors in the bat-
tle against the unions. Like foremen in the factories and super-
visors in the office, they were men and women in the middle, 
required to “execute 100 percent” of the directives that came 
from above, but also tasked with the creation of a productive 
and harmonious workplace. Although they may have been in-
tensely hostile to “outside” union organizers, managers and as-
sistant managers were enmeshed within a world of friendships 
and relationships that made them unreliable union fighters.207 
Trained for their entire career to conceive of the store as a 
communal family, they may well have been reluctant to insti-
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tute the divisive tactics necessary to split the workforce, create 
internal tensions, and thereby defeat the union campaign.208 
Thus, Brent Rummage, a former youth minister with the 
Church of God of Prophecy, who had been admitted to the Wal-
Mart management training program, was supposed to report 
any union talk to his store manager.209 But when his own 
mother, who worked in the same Hillview, Kentucky store to 
which he was assigned, ventured that unions might not be so 
bad, Rummage balked.210 “I wasn’t going to report my mother,” 
Rummage told a reporter.211 Likewise, Stan Fortune, a Wal-
Mart manager in Weatherford, Texas, refused a command to 
fire an employee suspected to talking to a union.212 According 
to Fortune, “I told him, ‘I’m not firing him. That’s illegal.’ . . . 
He got in my face and said, ‘You fire him or I’m going to fire 
you.’”213 The UFCW later hired both Rummage and Fortune as 
part of its organizing drive at Wal-Mart.214 
Almost as troublesome to the company were those manag-
ers who took their hostility to unionism all too personally. In 
the late 1990s and early years of the twenty-first century Wal-
Mart faced hundreds of unfair labor practice charges from the 
UFCW and other unions.215 They were expensive, time-
consuming and sometimes embarrassing to litigate, so Wal-
Mart tried to teach lower-level managers to walk a fine line be-
tween militant but legal antiunionism and those tactics that 
would generate an NLRB charge.216 This was the TIPS pro-
gram, spelled out in Wal-Mart’s “Manager’s Toolbox to Remain-
ing Union Free.”217 “Know your TIPS. As long as you do not 
threaten, interrogate, promise, or spy on your associates, Wal-
Mart, through your efforts, will be able to share its views on 
unionization in an open, honest and legal manner.”218 Natural-
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ly, it proved impossible to adhere to such admonitions in prac-
tice. How could managers warn workers of the union danger if 
they did not implicitly threaten them on the one hand and 
promise a better future, either individually or collectively, on 
the other? And how were managers to know when they should 
pick up the Wal-Mart “union hotline” to Bentonville, unless 
they interrogated or spied on those who worked for them?  
Thus trade unions lodged 288 unfair labor practice charges 
against Wal-Mart between 1998 and 2003.219 These included 
forty-one charges claiming improper firings, forty-four in-
stances in which Wal-Mart threatened employees if they joined 
a union, fifty-nine charges involving improper surveillance, and 
another fifty-nine asserting that Wal-Mart illegally interro-
gated its associates to determine their views on sensitive labor-
related issues.220 In all, ninety-four of these complaints were 
weighty enough to generate a formal NLRB complaint against 
the corporation.221 
When notice of union-organizing activity reached the com-
pany’s headquarters in Bentonville, Wal-Mart immediately put 
key members of its “labor team” on a corporate jet and dis-
patched them to the troubled store.222 At the height of the 
UFCW organizing campaign there were about twenty mid-level 
Wal-Mart executives assigned to this corporate office. Although 
some had law degrees, their function was not to litigate before 
the NLRB or any other agency of the government. That was left 
to one of many well-established, employer-side law firms on re-
tainer with the corporation. Instead, the labor team directed it-
self exclusively toward the “education” of store management 
and the associates who might have sparked the union drive or 
become subject to its siren song.223 Until the union drive was 
defeated, the labor team’s skilled operatives sidelined local 
management and effectively took over the store, orchestrating 
the antiunion effort to stay on legally justifiable terrain.224 As a 
manager in Colorado told Human Rights Watch, “We have a 
union activity hotline. If you hear associates, you don’t confront 
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them. You or the store manager calls the hotline. Then higher-
up management takes care of it.”225 Liz Boyd, a department 
manager at the Aiken, South Carolina Wal-Mart, reported that 
during the union campaign there, “[I]t was our duty . . . to re-
port any union activity and call the Union Hotline. Even now, if 
I hear of a union rumor, I’m supposed to notify management or 
call the hotline.”226 
III.  BLITZKRIEG AT KINGMAN   
The labor team was extremely active during the first years 
of the twenty-first century when the UFCW organizing cam-
paign was at its height. Thanks to the work of Human Rights 
Watch, which has made a thorough and devastating study of 
Wal-Mart’s antiunionism, there is an exceptionally well-
documented account of how this specialized unit operated to 
propagandize workers and thwart a union organizing effort at a 
typical Wal-Mart during those years. In many stores, the young 
men who work in the Tire and Lube Express (TLE) department 
have always been among those most receptive to the union 
idea.227 They get their hands dirty, they have few prospects for 
promotion, and they are well aware that similar blue collar jobs 
in garages and car dealerships pay a lot more. Such was the 
case in the Kingman, Arizona store, where an otherwise hu-
mane manager, under corporate pressure to keep labor and 
maintenance costs down, refused to spend the $200 needed to 
repair an air cooling system essential in the 110 degree sum-
mer heat.228 Throw in an arrogant, young—and female—TLE 
department head and all the ingredients were present for a un-
ion gambit.229 So TLE workers got in touch with the UFCW, 
which on August 28, 2000, filed a petition with the nearby 
Phoenix office of the NLRB to represent approximately eleven 
automotive service technicians.230  
The reaction from Wal-Mart was immediate, and little 
short of overwhelming. Within forty-eight hours, a Bentonville-
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based labor team was in Kingman, along with district and re-
gional managers.231 In all, more than twenty outside managers 
flooded the store, some to keep tabs on the mood of the asso-
ciates via the Wal-Mart CBWA system, or “Coaching By Walk-
ing Around”; others to help out with the time-consuming an-
nual inventory while the regular staff watched antiunion videos 
and attended near-daily captive meetings.232 At the TLE, Wal-
Mart replaced the manager with a high-level personnel execu-
tive, untutored in changing oil or tires, but well versed in the 
corporation’s union avoidance program.233 Loss Prevention was 
also busy, training a new set of cameras on work areas in the 
tire and lube shop.234 “I had so many bosses around me, I 
couldn’t believe it,” remembered Larry Adams, a union suppor-
ter who worked in the TLE at that time.235 “They weren’t there 
to help me. They were there to bug me. It was very intimidat-
ing.”236  
The key labor team figures were Vicky Dodson, a thirteen-
year veteran in Wal-Mart’s People division, and Kirk Williams, 
a young law school graduate from Chicago that Wal-Mart had 
hired just a few months before. Dodson was a pro, a forceful 
and controlling “pistol” remembered one of the assistant man-
agers who came under her authority;237 she was “an intelligent, 
articulate, sophisticated individual” in the more judicious 
words of an NLRB administrative law judge.238 Williams, who 
had worked his way through Kent State as a Wal-Mart assis-
tant store manager239 was a coldly ambitious functionary who 
would soon spend enormous amounts of time on the corporate 
jet putting out union fires throughout the company’s retail em-
pire. Most people in the store, management and worker alike, 
called the Bentonville labor team the “union busters.”240 The 
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“Nazi SS” was another phrase used by some workers.241 Not 
unexpectedly, Dodson and Williams were contemptuous of the 
existing store management, whose maladroit handling of 
layoffs and scheduling issues they blamed for precipitating the 
union uprising. “They took us out of the store for a couple of 
days,” remembered Assistant Manager Tony Kuc, “took us to a 
hotel, telling us how to handle the union, how to stop them 
from coming in . . . what to say, what not to say.”242 Within a 
few weeks the store manager had been transferred and de-
moted, his two assistant managers marked for dismissal, and 
the TLE district manager fired outright.243 
Within less than a week Dodson and her confederates met 
with ninety-five percent of all workers eligible to participate in 
the NLRB certification vote.244 Meanwhile, the labor team held 
meetings with all the salaried managers, as well as the hourly 
department heads, who they said were part of the store “man-
agement” and therefore ineligible to take part in an NLRB cer-
tification election.245 “We were basically spies, spies for the 
store, spies for the company,” remembered a disenchanted as-
sociate.246 “We had to run our departments, do everything nor-
mally, and then be spies for them. The stress level was so 
high.”247 Unionists complained, at Kingman and elsewhere, 
that “Wal-Mart has tricked hourly department managers into 
thinking they were part of the management team and, there-
fore, obligated to report any signs of union activity,” even 
though the NLRB ruled repeatedly against the company on the 
status of these hourly employees.248 Observed Michael Leonard, 
a UFCW official, “Wal-Mart’s M.O. is to test the limits of the 
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law, and to only change its prepackaged antiunion program 
when it is forced to . . . .”249  
The labor team screened one of five different antiunion 
videos every day. “Wal-Mart Under Attack” was a lurid depic-
tion of union thuggishness and disruption directed toward a 
company that was portrayed as merely trying to provide inex-
pensive goods for ordinary working people. “Sign Now, Pay 
Later” urged Wal-Mart workers to resist the siren song of the 
union organizers, who would do and say anything to win anoth-
er signature on a union card, all the while ensnaring the hap-
less retail worker in a world of burdensome dues and serf-like 
subservience to an alien, boss-ridden organization. These vid-
eos, always followed by a question and answer session with a 
member of the labor team, were highly effective. A worker later 
interviewed by Human Rights Watch remembered, “I actually 
had fears after seeing videos of Molotov cocktails and rocks, 
pelting rock, hurling bottles.”250 Another said, “After those 
meetings, minds started changing” as former union supporters 
turned against the UFCW.251 
On one alarmist charge Wal-Mart was at least partially 
correct. If the union got in, the “store would run with a ste-
ward . . . . The union will run the store. They will dictate the 
store. The store manager [will] respond to the steward, not the 
district manager . . . .”252 Indeed, unionization of even part of a 
Wal-Mart store would curb managerial authority, it might re-
duce their bonus, and it would introduce the seniority principle 
into the making of assignments and schedules.253 For example, 
Jon Lehman was a successful Wal-Mart store manager in the 
1990s who never made less than $140,000 a year during that 
decade.254 When he briefly left Wal-Mart late in the decade to 
manage a unionized Meijer store in Louisville, he found that 
while his pay was not as high as at Wal-Mart, the headaches 
were a lot less.255 “Meijer’s contract with the UFCW circum-
scribed the store manager’s power to assign work, hours and to 
offer raises, instead providing a well-defined matrix of job de-
scriptions, grade levels, and pay categories that existed only in 
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rudimentary and contingent form at Wal-Mart.”256 Likewise, 
unionized stores had a far higher proportion of full-time work-
ers on schedules pegged to their seniority, a system that Wal-
Mart executives declared would “fundamentally change the 
store’s business model.”257 
Dodson, Williams, and other top managers from the 
Southwest stayed in Kingman for two solid months. This was 
the period during which the local NLRB held hearings to de-
termine the size and composition of the TLE unit and in which 
both the UFCW and the Wal-Mart labor team marshaled their 
forces for the certification election itself. In minutely detailed 
reports back to Bentonville, labor team members described 
every instance of possible union talk, every wavering worker, 
and every meeting. Dodson and Willaims kept track of the 
workers who wore union pins and the ones who took them off, 
what comments were made at the captive meetings, and the 
degree of union sentiment in various departments of the 
store.258 The labor team authorized raises for a number of 
workers.259 On October 9, Tom Coughlin jetted into Kingman to 
tell a group of TLE workers that the Wal-Mart “Open Door,” 
not the UFCW, was the solution to their problems.260 This was 
a clear violation of the spirit, if not the letter, of the existing la-
bor law, which forbade management efforts to bribe, promise, 
or cajole employees in the midst of an organizing effort.261 “If 
you have any questions or problems,” Coughlin told his grease-
stained listeners, “don’t hesitate to call me, and I will get you 
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some results. . . . I can override anybody.”262 Then with a flou-
rish Coughlin put his telephone number on the white board and 
told store managers to leave it there.263 
Given all this, it is hardly surprising that the UFCW orga-
nizing drive collapsed in inglorious defeat. Although the NLRB 
ruled that the TLE was an appropriate bargaining unit,264 the 
union lost key supporters there within weeks of the labor 
team’s arrival in town.265 Union partisans had virtually no op-
portunity to counter the propaganda barrage unleashed by the 
Bentonville labor team.266 If they sought the telephone num-
bers of undecided associates, this violated Wal-Mart’s “no soli-
citation” rule. If they distributed leaflets in the parking lot or 
break room in the store, managers immediately called Loss 
Prevention and then patrolled the facility to pick up any stray 
literature. And when UFCW organizers made evening house 
calls, Wal-Mart denounced this tactic as harassment and inti-
midation. On October 24, UFCW lawyers filed a broad set of 
unfair labor practice complaints against Wal-Mart, thus post-
poning indefinitely the NLRB election scheduled for just a few 
days later.267 Working life for the remaining prounion people in 
the Kingman store became increasingly intolerable.268 Within 
little more than a year virtually all would be fired, forced to 
quit, or simply leave in disgust.269  
As with Kingman, the UFCW organizing effort hit a brick 
wall wherever it mustered enough support to organize a few 
house meetings or file for an NLRB election. The NLRB even-
tually ruled, at Kingman and elsewhere, that Wal-Mart had 
systematically harassed and spied on numerous workers, that 
it had threatened employees with a loss of benefits and raises if 
they supported the union, and that the company had fired out-
right key labor partisans.270 But none of this had any real im-
pact on Wal-Mart’s antiunion operation, if only because the pe-
nalties were so trivial: a few thousand dollars in back pay for a 
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few unjustly fired employees, plus a formal notice briefly posted 
in the break room pledging to obey the labor law.271 In its au-
thoritative report on Wal-Mart, Discounting Rights: Wal-Mart’s 
Violation of U.S. Workers’ Rights to Freedom of Association, 
Human Rights Watch concluded that the company “has trans-
lated its hostility towards union formation into an unabashed, 
sophisticated, and aggressive strategy to derail worker organiz-
ing at its U.S. stores that violates workers’ internationally rec-
ognized right to freedom of association.”272  
  CONCLUSION   
Wal-Mart’s capacity to prevent unionization of its stores 
has three consequences. As the largest private employer in the 
United States and the dominant corporation in the rapidly ex-
panding retail sector, Wal-Mart has strengthened and invigo-
rated the militant antiunionism that has long characterized 
American retailing. With the partial exception of the old-line 
grocery stores, a union-free work regime is the norm within a 
sector of the economy that now employs more workers than 
manufacturing.273 From Starbucks to Kmart, from Home Depot 
to Target, retail management has put in place personnel poli-
cies and procedures that mirror those pioneered or perfected at 
Wal-Mart.274 As the Limited Brands’ employee handbook puts 
it, “The very best employer-Associate relationships are one-on-
one. . . . We have proven consistently that there is no need for a 
labor union to represent our Associates in any matter. Our de-
dication to and practice of fair and equal treatment of all Asso-
ciates makes the need for a labor union unnecessary.”275 
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Wal-Mart’s gravitational impact on the retail world had its 
most dramatic manifestation in Southern California when the 
expectation that the corporation would build scores of Super-
centers, staffed by low-wage workers, helped ignite a four-
month UFCW strike and employer lockout by fifty-nine thou-
sand unionists in the old-line supermarkets, who sought to pre-
serve their wage and benefit standards.276 The work stoppage 
of 2003–2004 ended in a clear, if temporary, defeat in which  
Safeway, Albertsons, and other chains forced the union to ac-
cept a new contract that slashed starting wages, capped health 
insurance payouts, and reduced overall labor costs.277 Turnover 
soared, health care coverage declined, and employee morale 
plummeted, as the Wal-Martization of the supermarket work-
force seemed well advanced even within a retail sector where 
unions still enjoyed much formal recognition.278 
But such union setbacks were not the end of the story. 
Wal-Mart’s aggressive antiunionism has advanced a general 
repoliticization of what Progressives and New Dealers used to 
call “the labor question.”279 Because the union effort to build a 
collective bargaining system at Wal-Mart has proven such a 
complete defeat, the labor movement and its liberal allies have 
shifted tactics and venues. In an echo of the century old debates 
over the twelve-hour day at U.S. Steel, unsanitary conditions in 
the Chicago packinghouses, and child labor in the textile indus-
try, Wal-Mart’s wage and health benefit policies have become 
the subject of intense debate in hundreds of cities and in dozens 
of states. 
In scores of community “site fights,” most notably in New 
England, California, New York and Chicago, labor and its allies 
have used zoning regulations, environmental studies, and traf-
fic controls to prevent or delay the construction of one of Wal-
Mart’s huge, 180,000 square foot Supercenters. In California, 
such tactics have stymied Wal-Mart’s growth, which relieved 
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competitive pressure on the old-line supermarkets, thus enabl-
ing the UFCW to avoid another strike in 2007 and actually ne-
gotiate a new contract that won back for its members some of 
the wage-and-benefit concessions the union had made four 
years before.280 Even more ambitiously, states and cities with a 
bright blue political coloration have sought to directly legislate 
a minimum level of wages and health benefits for big-box em-
ployers, if only because of the policy stalemate at the federal 
level. Their efforts have generated but a mixed and partial out-
come, ensuring that Wal-Mart’s labor relations regime will re-
main a subject of political contestation, at both the national 
and metropolitan levels, for years to come.281 
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